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Incommensurability between successive scientific theories -- the impossibility of empirical evidence 
dictating the choice between them -- was Thomas Kuhn’s most controversial proposal. Toward 
defending it, he directed much effort over his last 30 years into formulating precise conditions under 
which two theories would be undeniably incommensurable with one another. His first step, in the late 
1960s, was to argue that incommensurability must result when two theories involve incompatible 
taxonomies. The problem he then struggled with, never obtaining a solution that he found entirely 
satisfactory, was how to extend this initial line of thought to sciences like physics in which taxonomy is 
not so transparently dominant as it is, for example, in chemistry. We will reconsider incommensurability 
in the light of examples in which evidence historically did and did not carry over continuously from old 
laws and theories to new ones. The transition from ray to wave optics early in the nineteenth century, 
we argue, is especially informative in this regard. The evidence for the theory of polarization within ray 
optics did not carry over to wave optics, so that this transition can be regarded as a prototypical case of 
discontinuity of evidence, and hence of incommensurability in the way Kuhn wanted. Yet the evidence 
for classic geometric optics did carry over to wave optics, notwithstanding the fundamental conceptual 
readjustment that Fresnel’s wave theory required. 
 
